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Abstract
The locus of value creation and innovation in the
software industry is shifting more and more to platform
ecosystems on which numerous developers create
extensions with additional functionalities based on the
platforms
core
architecture.
While
such
complementors may strongly profit from platforms,
there are considerable costs. Recent studies therefore
examined the costs of fitting apps to the specifications
of certain platforms; however, these works largely
neglect costs arising from the transactional
relationship between platform and complementor. In
order to shed light on this, our work examines how
design choices of platform governance and app
architecture impact the emergence of four types of
cost-inducing hazards within the transactional context
of the ecosystem. By using a configurational approach
based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(FsQCA), we display complex interactional effects of
the causal conditions on complementors’ perception of
hazardous environments and thus provide valuable
insights for both practice and theory on platform
ecosystems.

1. Introduction
The emergence of digital platforms like
Salesforce´s Force.com or SAP´s HANA substantially
changed the logic of innovation in the software
industry. Contrary to traditional approaches of software
engineering, modern software development strongly
relies on innovation from third-party developers, called
complementors [15]. The platform owner (e.g SAP)
provides an expandable resource base, which enables
other actors to develop applications that extend the
basic functionality of the platform. As a result, an
ecosystem emerges around the platform in which
platform owners and third-party developers interact in
complex ways. In such systems, the innovative
performance of single firms is not only determined by
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the innovative capabilities of a single firm, but
considerably influenced by the properties of the
surrounding ecosystem [45].
An essential task of a platform owner is therefore to
attract complementors to join the ecosystem and
thereby facilitate innovation and the generation of
complementary value propositions [5]. The
predominant current recipe to achieve this is by
creating and offering motivational factors and
relational rents [8, 19]. However, famous examples
like Blackberry´s mobile operating system show that
gaining solid traction among third-party developers
remains challenging. Often, platform ecosystems are
suffering fluctuation and high rates of desertion [35,
36].
A currently under-researched explanation for this
low traction and high rates of fluctuation may lie in the
fact that complementors face considerable costs when
joining a specific platform. If these costs are too high,
they can rapidly outweigh the additional value
generated by the ecosystem and provoke
complementors’ abandonment of a platform [44].
Previous studies that addressed this question primarily
took a technical perspective and focused solely on the
coordination costs related to platform dependencies
[35, 36]. However, to provide a more holistic analysis
of costs related to development activity on a platform,
also economic dimensions need to be considered. In
this context, transaction cost theory (TCT) is one of the
most prominent theoretical bases to explain and predict
relationships and boundary decisions associated with
interfirm exchange [2, 41]. From the perspective of
TCT, joining a platform might induce a cost
disadvantage relative to vertically integrated structures.
These costs can take different forms (e.g. search and
information costs; investments in social relations;
opportunity costs) which are mainly determined by
four potential hazards: behavioral uncertainty
concerning the platform owner, technological and
market uncertainty as well as asset specificity [29]. To
understand fluctuation in platform ecosystems, it is
therefore beneficial to take one step back and examine
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what causes the emergence of these four potential
hazards from the perspective of an individual
complementor.
Within this paper, we develop the overarching idea
that specificity, behavioral, technological and market
uncertainty are mainly influenced by design choices
taken by the platform owner as well as the individual
third-party developer. In particular, the interplay of the
control modes applied to govern the surrounding
ecosystem as well as the micro-architecture of single
apps will affect the extent to which the developer faces
cost-inducing hazards. As past research highlighted the
complex interplay of platform governance and app
micro architecture [35, 36], we decided not to rely on
regression-based net effect models but to apply
configurational theory and qualitative comparative
analysis (QCA) to this end. In doing so, we are able to
capture complex combinatorial causal effects “in
which an outcome may follow from several different
combinations of causal conditions” ([28]: p. 23). This
point of view is grounded in configurational theory and
allows us to apply a different paradigmatic lens for
understanding the complexities of platforms and
ecosystems [10]. In all, we aim at answering the
following research question:
Which configurations of architectural choices and
platform governance mechanisms minimize asset
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, technological and
market uncertainty in platform ecosystems?

2. Conceptual background
2.1. Transaction costs from a third-party
developer’s perspective
Transaction cost theory (TCT) [42, 43] provides
indications that by entering partnerships third-party
development might induce a cost disadvantage relative
to vertically integrated structures of software
development [44]. Such costs can arise due to certain
patterns of human behavior and characteristics of the
transaction environment [42, 43]. As human decision
making is characterized by bounded rationality, i.e. an
individual´s limitation in information processing and
rational decision making due to constraints on their
cognitive capabilities, occasions in which opportunistic
behavior might be favorable naturally emerge [42].
Turning to the context of platform ecosystems, such
potential hidden agendas bear considerable risk for
complementors, especially as the development on a
certain platform oftentimes involves high amounts of
up-front investments or commitments [44]. For
instance, knowledge leakage and imitation of own
software solutions may threaten the complementor’s
ability to create appropriable rents from these
investments [24]. As a consequence, third-party

developers will make further investments in order to
decrease such hazards, e.g. by acquiring intellectual
property rights and legal support [8]. The likelihood
and amount of potential losses due to opportunistic
behavior in the ecosystem is to a large part determined
by the transaction environment [42]. Therefore, the
amount of transaction costs that a complementor is
willing to accept mirrors the perceived degrees of the
four main determinants of transaction costs, namely
asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty on behalf of
the partner, as well as technological and market
uncertainty [29].
Asset specificity: The concept of asset specificity
describes the degree to which an investment will lose
value if the resource must be adopted for other
purposes. Specific assets are significantly more
valuable in a particular exchange relationship than
within alternative partner relations and lead to a ‘lockin’ effect to a certain platform [41]. If a complementor
has to spend significant amounts of time and money in
order to create tailored procedures, routines and
systems concerning one particular platform, these
“sunk” investments are likely to be of no value in the
face of migrating to another platform [46].
Consequently, if a complementor perceives high levels
of asset specificity it will expect high transaction costs.
Behavioral uncertainty: Second, behavioral
uncertainty arises from the instance that partnership
evaluation is often complex and the partner’s actions
and performance are hard to evaluate [29]. This can be
further strengthened if the partner refuses to share
information, disguises or distorts it [34]. Particularly
within the context of platforms, there are quite
asymmetric relationships between platform owners and
complementors [7] so that a large part of the costs
emerging from behavioral uncertainty is on the
complementors’ side. So, the less predictable the
platform owner’s behaviors are, the more
complementors will perceive the necessity to invest in
corresponding safeguards.
Technological uncertainty: Third, technological
uncertainty as one key dimensions of environmental
turbulence refers to the unpredictability of the firm's
environment. While technological evolution is
unpredictable in principle [37], complementors
furthermore face technological uncertainties especially
because it is the platform owner who sets crucial
technological framing conditions like for instance
APIs, SDKs, system governance (component
boundaries and real-time support) and shared assets
(e.g., maps, fields for data input-output) [6]. These may
heavily influence the value and functionality of new
and existing apps. Third-party developers therefore
face an adaptation problem and might be forced to
adjust internal resources, external agreements and
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especially the relationship towards the platform owner
in order to fit the new external circumstances [29].
Hence, on the one hand, the less predictable the
technological surroundings are, the more likely are upfront investments to make agreements adaptive. On the
other hand, uncertainty may induce opportunistic
behavior by the platform owner, e.g. through extracting
concessions at the partner’s expense [40]. The
consequence of this is a propensity of higher
transaction costs.
Market uncertainty: Volatility of market conditions
(e.g. market, demand, and competitive environment) is
the second dimension of environmental uncertainty.
This volatility represents a crucial source of cost for
complementors, as for instance the sustainability of
their specific niche is required for them to succeed
[26]. In the context of platforms, the degree of market
uncertainty quite strongly depends on the
characteristics of the platform. As the platform
mediates the relationship between end users, the
complementor and its peers, platform design choices
such as licensing policies or the provision of
technological support may considerably influence the
volatility in platform entrance, desertion or competitive
behavior [9]. Facing these obstacles, complementors
are confronted with another type of adaptation problem
which analogously to technological uncertainty might
induce higher costs.

by itself is not sufficient to accelerate evolution as
every change of the extension requires guaranteeing
interoperability and quality standards of the ecosystem.
Each variable in isolation therefore has no robust effect
on this outcome.
On the other hand, configurational theories assume
asymmetric rather than symmetric relations between
conditional and outcomes variables [10]. This implies
equifinality between different initial conditions and
development paths [28]. Consequently, conditions may
either be sufficient or necessary causes of a dependent
variable. According to both organizational [12] and
information systems research [23] such notions
superiorly accommodate organizational realities. As
El-Sawy et al. [10] point out, this perspective therefore
particularly fits the purpose of analyzing the
organization of digital ecosystems.

2.2.
Platform
governance
and
app
microarchitecture as configurational antecedents of
cost-inducing hazards
Fig. 1 illustrates the framework of this research. It
proposes that the configuration of platform governance
mechanisms and app microarchitecture influences a
complementor´s transaction costs in platform
ecosystems [37]. Rather than relying on conventional
reductionistic models, we assume that a specific
outcome depends on the configuration of variables
rather than the net effects of the individual factors.
This approach is suitable for the context of our
research for two reasons.
On the one hand, configurational approaches treat
sets of variables as single predictors [25]. These serve
to simultaneously explain the outcome of interest so
that configurational theory is well suited to uncover
synergetic and complementary effects [28]. This
resonates well with current theoretical perspectives on
platform and ecosystem management. These highlight
the inseparability of platform governance from app
architecture in their mutual effect on organizational
outcomes. For instance, Tiwana [35, 36] shows that the
evolutionary capabilities of a platform are catalyzed by
the level of input control because app modularization

Figure 1. Research framework
In the selection of our causal conditions, we follow
notions of Tiwana et al. [37] and Tiwana [35] on IT
and especially intraplatform dynamics. The former
outline three core mechanisms of how to execute IS
governance: decision rights, control and system
architecture. Building on this foundation, Tiwana [35]
outlines the inseparability of these mechanisms as
predictors of platform outcomes. In line with previous
work that focuses on the influence of governance on
transaction costs, we therefore rely on configurations
of these three governance dimensions to explain costinducing hazards [2]. We operationalize platform
governance as both the control mechanisms and the
locus of decision rights within the relationships
between platform owner and the individual third-party
developers. In the context of platforms, such
governance mechanisms are usually designed and
introduced by the platform owner and are not
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necessarily suited to reduce costs bilaterally. While
certain mechanisms may allow the platform owner to
minimize asset specificity and uncertainty, some of
those may simultaneously increase the transaction
costs of complementors. Still, also third-party
developers possess design alternatives based on which
they can influence their relation to the platform.
Concretely, the microarchitecture (in contrast to the
macro architecture of the overall platform) of their
apps allows complementors to minimize costs by
exploiting benefits of modularization of the linkages
between the platform and the app [35, 36]. Summing
up these insights, our set of causal conditions
encompasses the most commonly applied IS
governance forms on platforms. It includes design
elements from control (clan control, input control),
decision rights partitioning (centralization of decision
rights) as well as architecture (app decoupling and
standardized interfaces).
The first dimension, control, refers to the
mechanisms established by a platform owner that
govern actions of the partners. Decision rights as the
second dimension of platform governance encompass
extension app features, functionality, design, and
implementation procedures [34, 35]. Both elements
represent design choices which are largely on the
behalf of the platform owner.
Clan control: The most common informal
mechanism to govern partners and the interaction
within an ecosystem is clan control. This form of
control is accomplished by mutual values and shared
goals between the “clan” of complementors and the
platform owner [17]. For instance, platform owners
may release norms, mutual values and goals that are
beneficial for the platform. When either a
complementor or the platform owner shows deviant
behavior, other members of the clan might react with
social sanctioning. On the dyadic level, clan control
therefore results in behaviors of both the platform
owner and the complementor that would not violate
such values by acting opportunistically. As a result,
levels of uncertainty for the complementor will be
reduced if clan control is prevalent within the platform
ecosystem.
Input control: A suitable formal control mechanism
for platform ecosystems is input control. It describes
the degree to which platform owners control
complementary apps by utilizing application and
selection processes [35]. Hence, not all complementary
apps are admitted to the ecosystem. Input control keeps
tabs on the admission to the ecosystem and allows the
platform owner to guarantee interoperability, quality or
the fit with the platform’s interests, values, and
positioning [36].

Centralization of decision rights: Apart from
different modes of control, another central element of
platform governance is the degree to which decision
rights are centralized or delegated [36]. This form of
governance encompasses different classes of decision
rights [11]. Taken to the platform context, platform
owners distribute decisions about what an app should
do (e.g., features and functionality), how it should do it
(e.g., design, user interface), and the control of
boundary resources (e.g. the platform´s interfaces)
among itself and the complementors [36]. Though
platform owners are often willing to delegate decision
rights to complementors because these possess
nuanced knowledge about the app’s means and ends, in
the case of strategically relevant extensions, owners
may decide to keep or retract that authority [35, 36].
While the mode of platform governance represents
a design choice on the behalf of the platform owner,
the
individual
complementors
may
choose
corresponding design elements on their own [35, 36].
Thereby, app modularization is focusing on linkages
between the platform and the app, which is defined as
the “degree to which an app is loosely coupled and
interacts through standardized interfaces with the
platform.” ([34]: p. 268). In general, modularity
reduces the complementor’s specific investments in
knowledge and technologies that are bound to a certain
platform and thus, in line with previous literature on
modularity [3], we thus assume that modularization
reduces transaction costs. The architectural concept of
modularization can be theoretically described along
two distinctive dimensions: decoupling of an app from
the platform, and the use standardized interfaces as
linkage [31].
App decoupling: The level of decoupling describes
an architecture in which changes within the
architecture of the platform do not have any ripple
effect on the single app. The more decoupled an app is,
the more independently it can be developed by a
complementor while still ensuring fluent interoperation
with the platform. Usually, the complementor makes
such a design choice within the exogenous constraints
of the platform and minimizes the platform
dependencies on the minimal degree to which an app is
required to be conforming to the specifications
interface [35]. This is achieved by carefully selecting
and placing “thin connections” between app and
platform while removing the remaining ones so that
changes to the app or the platform do not condition
changes to the respective counterpart [39].
Standardization of interfaces: On the other hand,
the standardization of interfaces describes the degree to
which the linkages between the single app and the
platform are stable, formalized and well-documented
[36]. Thereby, stability is ensured by the existence of
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boundary resources like application programming
interfaces (APIs) [36]. Such standards codify the
relationships between the app and the platform as well
as clearly articulate rules and specifications for apps
and platform infrastructure. Such clarity and
transparency might help to overcome issues of
opportunism and bounded rationality, so that
transaction costs can be reduced.

instrument and ensure validity, reliability as well as
rigor of our main study’s results [22]. Therefore, we
adapted existing scales to the platform context. Refined
items were again evaluated in a pre-test to ascertain
that our survey items were interpreted unambiguously
(see Table 1).
Table 1 Measurement scales

3. Research methodology
3.1. Data collection
The sampling frame of our research consists of 750
firms equally distributed among the complementors of
five leading cloud platforms (i.e. Microsoft Azure,
Oracle Cloud Platform, Amazon Web Services, SAP
HANA, and Salesforce Force.com). The platforms
were chosen for two reasons. First, they are all wellestablished and have a solid traction among
complementors. Second, due to their size and high
level of power imbalance, they perfectly meet our
requirements for analyzing asymmetric third-party
relationship and the corresponding risk.
Congruent with previous surveys of third-party
innovators [4], we utilized a web-crawling approach
which randomly collected contact data from the
platforms´ app stores. A link to the online
questionnaire was sent via mail and recipients were
asked to forward the questionnaire to high-level
executives (C-level; IT executives) as key informants
[20]. The invitation mail and the start page of our
survey included the purpose of the study and ensured
confidentiality and anonymity to the participants.
Our sampling approach resulted in a total of N=42
valid cases (response rate: 5.6 percent), which is a
common response rate in such settings. We assessed
non-response bias by comparing response of early and
late respondents [1]. T-tests between the means of the
early and late respondents did not reveal any
significant differences (p > 0.05), hence rejecting the
presence of non-response bias in our study.
Complementors in our study were distributed
among all five platforms (Microsoft Azure: 9; Oracle
Cloud Platform: 4; Amazon Web Services: 2; SAP
HANA: 9; and Salesforce Force.com: 14). Most of our
respondents were high-level executives (C-level: 71.4
percent; BU executives: 19 percent). Participants in our
sample indicated that they are highly experienced in
this topic (>10 years: 83.3 percent) and were experts in
the context of our survey (95.2 percent).

3.2. Measurement validation
We used a pilot study with managers in the
software industry to construct our measurement

Our constructs display evidence of reliability with
Cronbach’s α greater than .85 for all variables.
Confirmatory factor analysis yielded adequately high
factor loadings concerning the latent constructs and
allows us to assert discriminant validity as the Fornell
Larcker criterion is fulfilled for all our study variables
[13]. To test common method bias, we conducted
Harman’s one-factor test [27]. The unrotated factor
solution resulted in 8 factors explaining 85 percent of
the variance (33 percent was the largest variance
explained by one factor). Thus, common method bias
is unlikely to be a problem.

3.3. Fuzzy-set QCA
We analyzed the obtained data via Fuzzy-set QCA
(FsQCA). FsQCA draws on a set-theoretic approach
which emphasizes the effects of the whole rather than
its pieces. Hence, it explicitly acknowledges the
multidimensionality of research cases [12]. Thereby,
FsQCA evaluates the predictive power of the
potentially possible configurations of study variables
based on measures of consistency and coverage.
Consistency values are analogous to correlation
estimates in statistical methods. This indicator displays
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to which degree cases that share a certain combination
of conditions agree in leading to a given outcome [28].
Coverage on the other hand represents the degree to
which a configuration accounts for the instances of an
outcome. Thus, coverage values are analogous to Rsquare values in regression analysis. For a single
configuration, FsQCA calculates two different
coverage values. The raw coverage provides a measure
which displays in what percentage of the cases in the
dataset this particular configuration can be observed
[28]. As a single case may be covered by different
configurations, it is useful to additionally calculate
unique coverage. This indicator estimates the
percentage of cases that display membership in the
configuration of interest, but not in any other
configuration in the solution set [28]. In order to detect
configurations which are consistent to the outcome in
question, FsQCA comprises three steps [28]:
calibration, construction of truth tables, truth table
analysis.
The first step is calibration. As FsQCA construes
configurations of conditional variables as sets in which
research cases can be either member or non-member,
calibration of the variable measures is necessary in
order to obtain the cases’ degree of memberships in a
certain set of conditions (here, e.g. membership in the
group of firms with highly decoupled apps). Thus, all
construct measures must be transformed from Likert
scale values into fuzzy set membership scores which
range between 0 and 1 with 0 indicating full nonmembership, 1 indicating full membership and 0.5
representing the crossover point [32]. Within this work,
we choose the observed maximum and minimum
values within the sample to specify full membership
and full non-membership for all variables and the
calculated scale midpoint (median of observed values)
as cross-over point. This is analogous to the calibration
approach by Fiss [12]. The three values gained through
this procedure served as input variables for the
calibration procedure in the FsQCA software program
[28] which transforms all Likert scale measures to set
membership scores.
The construction and refinement of truth tables
represent the second step of analysis. A truth table is a
matrix of all possible configurations of antecedent
conditions. In our case, it consists of 32 rows (in
general 2k, where k is the number of conditions
observed [28]). Subsequently, the truth table is refined
so that it fits the requirements of FsQCA. In the
refinement procedure, each possible configuration is
assessed based on two criteria: frequency and
consistency. The frequency criterion captures how
many empirical cases with a membership score of
more than 0.5 in a certain configuration are necessary
in order to include the configuration in further analysis.

The standard threshold for frequency in medium-sized
samples is 1 meaning that every configuration that
exists in the empirical dataset will be part of the
analysis [32]. The consistency criterion captures if a
truth table row displays a consistent subset of the
outcome and should outreach a value of at least .8 [28].
In this work, we choose a rather conservative threshold
of .9. Overall, 32 cases involved configurations
exceeding the frequency threshold of which 7 also
exceeded the consistency threshold for asset
specificity, 17 for behavioral uncertainty, 18 for
technological uncertainty and 17 for market
uncertainty.
Finally, in the third step, the truth tables are
analyzed based on Boolean algebra. Counterfactual
analysis represents the basic principle of this step. The
approach applies the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that
identifies combinations of factors which consistently
lead to a certain outcome by stripping away factors that
are inconsistently present or absent concerning the
particular outcome [12]. By doing so, the algorithm
excludes conditions that are no essential part of a
sufficient configuration for the respective outcome. As
a result, the analysis produces two distinct solutions:
the parsimonious solution and the intermediate
solution. The parsimonious solution includes all
simplifying assumptions derived from counterfactuals
in contrast to the intermediate solution which only
includes simplifying assumptions based on easy
counterfactuals. Hence, the intermediate solution
always represents a subset of the parsimonious solution
which passed a more thorough reduction procedure. In
other words, the data thus provides strong empirical
evidence for the causality of these conditions present in
the parsimonious solution. This solution thus displays
the causal core of a configuration, while the causal
periphery includes all conditions present in the
intermediate solution [12].

4. Results
The FsQCA approach yielded a number of
solutions with considerably high consistency that
explains a substantive proportion of complementors’
potential hazards. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for
high asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and
technological uncertainty and market uncertainty
whereas Tables 4 and 5 display configurations which
lead to the non-existence of those hazards. We
followed the notation for solution tables by Ragin [28]
with black circles (“•”) displaying the presence of a
condition, crossed-out circles (“⊗”) indicating its
absence and blank spaces indicate that a condition may
be either present or absent. Large Circles thereby refer
to core conditions, small circles indicate peripheral
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conditions. The solutions are grouped on the basis of
their core conditions.

4.1. Configurations for high levels of hazard
There are two different core configurations
resulting in high asset specificity, three resulting in
behavioral uncertainty, four resulting in technological
uncertainty and three resulting in market uncertainty
(some core configurations split-up into several
permutations, these are marked by lower case letters).
Consistency for the single configurations ranges from
.86 to .94, acceptable levels [28]. The overall
consistency values for the four contextual hazards are
.90, .85, .85, and .87. Roughly spoken, overall these
values display the degree to which the configurations
consistently result in the outcome of interest.
Therefore, we can say that these five solutions
consistently result in high levels of hazard with 90, 85,
85 and 87 percent. Overall solution coverage
represents the extent to which the configurations cover
cases of the respective outcome [28]. Hence, it
explains what percentage of membership for the
outcome set can be captured by the configurations of
conditions. Thus, cases with high levels of asset
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, technological
uncertainty and market uncertainty are covered to 52,
79, 82 and 82 percent respectively by the solutions
presented in the tables.
Table 2. Configurations for high asset specificity
and behavioral uncertainty

technological uncertainty from a complementor’s
viewpoint. In contrast, concerning market uncertainty
both its presence (solution 1) and absence (solution 3)
are core elements of configurations.
Pattern II) The only configuration which
consistently lead to asset specificity, behavioral
uncertainty and technological uncertainty involves the
presence of input control, the absence of clan control
mechanisms and the presence of app decoupling.
Hence, under such forms of platform control, the
complementor may be unable to lower transaction
costs based on own design choices in the
microarchitecture.
Pattern III) With exception to solutions 2a and 2b
for market uncertainty, hazards from the
complementor’s perspective are always associated with
the platform owner ensuring itself a portion of power
within the governance form. This may be either via
input control or via centralized decision rights.
Pattern IV) Third-party developers’ choice to
standardize and formalize the interface of their apps
towards a single platform may under certain
circumstances be a necessary mechanism to reduce the
uncertainty they face when interacting with the
platform. However, this comes at the cost of specific
investments in their relationship with the platform, so
that there may be a trade-off between reducing
uncertainty via standardization and vice versa
increasing asset specificity by doing so.
Table 3. Configurations for high technological
and market uncertainty

4.2. Configurations for low levels of hazard
By comparing the configurations across all four
dimensions of hazards, we found four strong patterns:
Pattern I) If platform owners heavily rely on
mechanisms of input control, this causes high levels of
asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty and

There are two different core configurations
resulting in low levels of asset specificity, three
resulting in low levels of behavioral uncertainty, four
resulting in low levels of technological uncertainty and
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one resulting in low level market uncertainty.
Consistency for the single configurations ranges from
.88 to .93. The overall consistency values for the four
contextual hazards are .88, .89, .90, and .93. Overall
solution coverage for low levels of asset specificity,
behavioral uncertainty, technological uncertainty and
market uncertainty is at .49, .80, .84 and .59.

uncertainty is only achieved consistently if
modularization in the form of app decoupling and
standardized interfaces is present.
Table 5. Configurations for low technological
and market uncertainty

Table 4. Configurations for low asset specificity
and behavioral uncertainty

5. Insights and implications

By comparing the configurations across all four
dimensions of hazards, we found four strong patterns:
Pattern V) Clan control seems to be an effective
mechanism to reduce complementors’ transaction
costs. Its attenuating effect appears if a) either input
control is low or decision making is delegated (for
behavioral and technological uncertainty), b) if
decision rights are centralized and input is controlled
but concurrently app decoupling and interface
standardization are present (behavioral uncertainty),
and c) if the complementor resigns to standardize its
platform-app interfaces (asset specificity).
Pattern VI) If clan control is absent, low levels of
hazard are still possible, but only if either the
complementor modularizes its app architecture via
decoupling or the platform owner does not draw on
governance mechanisms which grant it power, namely
centralized decision making and input control.
Pattern VII) The absence of both centralized
decision rights and input control reduces behavioral
and market uncertainty from the complementor’s
viewpoint.
Pattern VIII) Non-modularization of the app
microarchitecture seems to be necessary for low levels
of asset specificity whereas low perceived market

Our primary objective in this paper is to analyze the
antecedents of complementors’ transaction costs in
platform ecosystems. In particular, we attempt to shed
light on how the interplay between the architecture of
an extension and the different governance mechanisms
of platform owners facilitate or diminish the
emergence of hazards in the relational context which
are likely to raise third-party developers’ transaction
costs.
The results of our configurational analysis provide
several interesting insights for both theory and
practice. First, while platform owners might benefit
from governance mechanisms which grant them power
and authority over the development of the ecosystem,
these mechanisms are quite likely to confront the
platforms complementors with several hazards.
Compared to the centralization of decision rights, input
control seems to be a particularly important
mechanism. If input control is applied, all types of
hazards are likely to be high. However, if input control
is absent, all types of hazards are likely to be low. The
screening and admission procedures of the platform
owner consequently require specific investments to
meet such criteria. Furthermore, such control fosters
uncertainty as it gives the platform owner a certain
amount of power. Input control therefore represents an
essential parameter which platform owners should
calibrate carefully in order to balance own as well as
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complementors’ costs and thus ensure healthiness and
robustness of the ecosystem.
Second, the results indicate that clan control may
be an effective mechanism for the platform owner to
lower complementors’ hazards. Such norms, mutual
values and goals as soft power instrument help to lower
asset specific, behavioral and technological
uncertainty. If the platform owner abstains from
applying just one of those two power ensuring
mechanisms, then clan control is a sufficient way to
keep hazards and consequently complementor´s
transaction costs low. Hence, clan control might to a
certain degree be a suitable measure to lower the
negative effects of input control and decision rights
centralization.
Finally, the complementor itself can influence the
emergence of hazards within the transaction
atmosphere. However, the impact of modularizing the
design of own apps is limited and comes at costs. On
the one hand, app decoupling and standardized
interfaces may help to reduce behavioral, technological
and market uncertainty. This can be explained as app
modularization reduces the effects of technological
changes within the platform on a single app and
ensures that the complementor can counteract to
opportunistic behavior and market changes quickly.
Still, these effects only apply constantly if input control
is not present or if clan control is applied. Hence,
design choices by the complementor possess rather low
ability to overcome the effects of design choices made
by the platform owner. On the other hand, our data
provides evidence for app decoupling and interface
standardization to be both necessary and sufficient
conditions for high levels of asset specificity. This
finding seems counterintuitive and calls for further
investigations.
In all, we extend theory on platform ecosystems in
three ways. First, this study contributes to previous
work on factors that influence ecosystem dynamics [8]
by extending current perspectives on costs. Therefore,
we propose TCT, which IS research traditionally uses
in research on outsourcing [2, 41], as a valuable
theoretical lens for platform management. Second, we
investigate the antecedents of such costs by examining
the influence of the interplay between modular systems
and different modes of platform governance on four
types of hazards which may arise in the relation
between complementor and platform. Third and
finally, we provide a fresh theoretical and
methodological perspective on this topic by
acknowledging the configurational nature of platforms
and apply FsQCA to detect meaningful combinations
of the input variables. We hope that these
configurations may serve as holistic templates which
will stimulate academic discussion and prove useful for

executives in software development and platform
managers.
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